…the Casual Destruction of a Small Democratic State by a Despotic Major World Power

Taking a brief recess from the ballot measures, I thought I’d throw some rocks out there in the idyllic summer pond of our thoughts. Unless you’ve been living under said rock, you know that the Russian military cruised into the Caucasus nation of Georgia last week and polished off the US-supplied Georgian military like a postprandial shot of vodka. Most Americans gave it the same attention they gave the Olympic archery competition. It’s tempting to listen to the isolationists lulling us to sleep with the “it’s a centuries-old conflict between parties you should care nothing about” routine, just as they did for Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and Darfur. In fact, the invasion has a lot to do with geography, history, and the role of the US in the modern world.

Looking at a map, you might be forgiven for thinking, “It’s understandable that they would have a dispute. Look, they’re right next to each other.” Yes, they do share a border. They share a border formed by the Greater Caucasus Mountain Range, an 800 mile mountain range where the passes average 8,000 feet. In other words, North and South Ossetia are on opposite sides of one of the larger mountain ranges in the world. In fact, the only generally passable way from Russia directly into South Ossetia (soft “t”, by the way) is the 2.5 mile long Roki Tunnel, which is itself at 10,000 feet in elevation. Even that road is often impassible in winter. The other routes include a 200 year old road that itself crests at 10,000 feet and a road that leads directly from Russia to the capital of Tbilisi, and only then over to South Ossetia. Why, you may ask, did the Georgians not simply blow the tunnel to keep the Russians out?

Well, that brings us to politics. South Ossetia’s population is composed of about 70,000 people in a checkerboard of Georgian and Ossetian villages. Ever since the break up of the Soviet Union, the Ossetians have generally preferred to affiliate themselves with the more powerful Russia, while the Georgian people understandably prefer Georgia, with its capitol just a relatively flat 70 miles away. Over time, the Russians sponsored immigration from Russia of “patriots”, usually well-armed by the Russians, to South Ossetia. You see, the Russians don’t like the fact that Georgia has the only competing pipeline to the Russians’ for Caspian Sea oil. As a result, the province has been largely autonomous, meaning that it’s run locally, with little influence from Tbilisi.

The Tbilisi government elected in 2004 won with a platform of re-assimilating South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another province in a similar situation. In 2006, some portion of the South Ossetians voted for independence. Most Westerners thought this was a bad idea, given the lack of a sufficient economy and population to exercise independence in any meaningful way. The likelihood that independence would result in a de facto annexation by the Russian government also crossed many minds. Georgia asked to join NATO, the West’s foremost mutual defense treaty. NATO, a consensus-run organization, declined to offer them membership, largely due to the prescience of the German government, which did not want to end up in a shooting war with the Russians over South Ossetia.

I’ll pause for a digression here on what might be generically termed “sub-states”. By this, I mean conglomerations of people with strong identities, but probably not large enough populations or economies to support outright independence. They tend to fall into four categories – independent, but not self-sustaining and desiring assimilation by a “friendly country” (Kosovo); independent and self-sustaining, but weak (Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, arguably East Timor); not independent, but autonomous (South Ossetia and Abkhazia before the recent conflict); and “oppressed” – desiring independence or autonomy, but not getting it (Chechnya). Unfortunately, we have yet to find a way to effectively negotiate non-violent resolutions to these problems, with the notable exception of Montenegro. Ideally, of course, Georgia and South Ossetia would have reached a compromise with the help of the international community, that provided some autonomy for the Ossetians but preserved the rights of Georgians in the region and resulted in the disarmament of the Russian-supported militia.

But, as the Bosnian Serbs were fond of saying, “Why should I be a minority in your country when you can be a minority in mine?” In other words, big brother will protect us, even though Russia annexing South Ossetia makes about as much sense as Mexico assimilating Southern California. (Why not? There are lots of Mexican nationals living there, after all, arguably under the oppression of the US government. You see my point.)

Unwisely in retrospect, the Georgian government decided to act, tired of tolerating a Russian-supplied armed insurgency within its own borders. It seems likely that the facts will bear out that they did use military force, but not the indiscriminate murder of civilians alleged by the Russians. Human Rights Watch has documented only about 100 civilian deaths, a number consistent with a reasonable attempt to minimize casualties by the Georgian military and the inherent difficulty in separating civilians from insurgents in a guerrilla war.

This brings us back to the Roki Tunnel. Why didn’t they blow it? They kept it open because they were hoping to force the Russian-supplied insurgents back into Russia. When the Russians decided that this was the perfect opening to roll an armored division through it, the Georgians were caught flat-footed. What followed was the casual dismemberment of a major US regional ally by the overpowering Russian military under the direction of “don’t-call-me President” Putin. Fool yourself about the state of Russian power if you like, but Medvedev was in Moscow, while Putin was right across the border in North Ossetia.

Knowing an open door when they see it, the Russians idly nabbed Abkhazia, then followed up by the seizure of Gori, splitting the country in two, and Poti, a major Black Sea port. President Bush made a few speeches and went back to watching the Olympics. The Georgians, knowing a sell out when they see one, pointed out that the US had sponsored them for NATO membership, which would have obligated the US to defend them.

Apparently, the US Government does have some shame, because we decided to actually do something eventually. We had decided early on that this wasn’t worth killing Russians over, not when that would require pulling troops out of Iraq and, in all fairness, risking World War III. Personally, I favored sending the ready brigade of the 82nd Airborne to defend Tbilisi, on the theory that the Russians weren’t interested in starting World War III, either, and would thus stop their aggression.

To given them their due, the Bush Administration out-thought me on this one. Instead, they’ve sent “humanitarian aid” in USAF airplanes and (in the near future) US Navy ships. This accomplishes the same thing – putting Americans where Russia will have to shoot them to continue the war – as sending in the 82nd, without appearing as provocative. Petulant, the Russians have signed a truce, but continue to engage in an orgy of property damage – mostly Georgian military equipment that we sold them and NATO-designed military bases.

In theory, the Russians will eventually withdraw back to Russia. The Georgians have essentially agreed to resolve the issues of South Ossetia and Abkhazia peacefully. Now we’re all one big happy family, right? Well, call me cynical, but it seems to me like the Russians might not behave honorably regarding their agreements without something to back it up. Realistically, this means the presence of US or other Western peacekeepers on the ground in the regions to ensure Russian demilitarization and the disarmament of the local militia.

More importantly to you and me, it will require that the US to punish Russia in the political, economic and military spheres. We’ve already started, discussing the discontinuation of Russian involvement with NATO and possible expulsion of Russia from the G8. Where the rubber hits the road is whether we will be willing to defend Georgia militarily if the Russians continue to act in bad faith.

Critics of our involvement tend to cite the Weinberger Doctrine. That theoretical limitation on the use of military power states, among other requirements, that we should only use military power to defend the vital interests of the US. In the critics’ reasoning, the defense of a relatively politically unimportant ally (again, their view) in a region right on Russia’s borders doesn’t qualify as a vital national interest.

I would counter that we learned two lessons in recent history, one from the Cold War and one from the mid-90’s. First, from the Cold War, we should accept that the defense of free peoples from outside aggression is always in the vital national interest of the United States. We have the most impact in the political and moral sphere when we use military force only to protect the freedom of people worldwide. A clear economic incentive to intervene actually undermines our influence.

Second, from the mid-90’s debacles in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia, we should know that we must be willing to commit overwhelming military force to support our commitments. The peril of working within consensus-driven organizations like the UN is the inherent compromises of the decision-making processes there are inimical to effective military action. Put another way, we’ve got to be willing to put up or shut up.

The NATO and UN Charters support this approach for self-defense missions. Title V requires member nations to lend assistance to defend a member. We invoked this after 9/11, and the Europeans responded. The UN Charter also supports defense of an ally as a legitimate reason for the use of military force. Contrary to popular belief, we could have legally intervened in Georgia without a UN Security Council resolution.

Yes, but why should we care? The US has an unfortunate history of periods of intervention, followed by periods of isolationism. Invariably, our inattention to world events leads to situations that require us to intervene militarily, rather than allowing us to catch them early, when they could be resolved peacefully. In light of our bad experience in Iraq, the American people would like to sit out the next few years, build the economy back up, and forget.

Unfortunately, Russian ambitions will not permit us to neglect the obligations imposed by our privileged status in the world. Neglecting the Caucasus and Central Asia, whether allowing Russian hegemony over Georgia or the persistence of despotic regimes in the ‘Stans, will invariably result in war down the road. Georgia gives us the opportunity to intervene militarily, but non-violently, as peacekeepers in the disputed regions.

But even that will not suffice. We need to be willing to exert strong pressure on Russia economically and politically to bring them to the negotiating table to resolve the issues of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We must also be even-handed, pushing the Georgian government to accept reasonable concessions to local autonomy in exchange for territorial integrity. If we fail in this, we will find ourselves in the middle of a shooting war.

Like China, Russia has not fully accepted that status as a world power implies an obligation to promote free societies. They see their short-term interest as preserving or promoting friendly regimes, no matter how despotic, on their borders. This preserves military and economic security over the short term, but sacrifices long term stability, as no people will tolerate oppression indefinitely. We are still learning this one ourselves, after all. We still have trouble accepting that Middle Eastern countries can exist as Islamic republics with church/state balances that don’t exactly mirror our own and policies that don’t entirely favor us, provided that they demonstrate a long term commitment to freedom and democracy. We’ve reached this point in Iraq. Our troops have reached the point where they cause as many problems as they solve in that society. Not so with a commitment to the Balkans – they want us there to protect them and preserve the peace and freedom of a democratic government. Without us, they will fare poorly against the Russian military and we will have to intervene militarily in the region in the future. We owe it to our children to stay involved in the Caucasus.

The views expressed here are those of the author, and not necessarily those of his employer.